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Most of the world looks away from the pain 
and murder of the weak. 
Arthur Hertzberg (NewYorkReview 
of Books, 6 May 90, p. 40) 
It's better to know notbing tban to know 
what ain't so. 
Josh Billings (l9th century) 
The irrepressible Bernard E. Rollin has written a 
lively, provocative, and scholarly book on several pivotal 
bioethical issues in nonhuman animal research. 
Professor Rollin of Colorado State University asks-
and answers - whether nonhuman animals think, feel, 
and suffer. Rollin asks whether the prevailing scientific 
justification for banning nonhuman animals is based on 
rational assessment of the issues or is simply ideological 
blindness. He offers a rousing and contemptuous "yes" 
to the latter view. Jane Goodall, in the book's forward, 
notes thatscientific ideology [likeall ideology, including 
philosophical ideology] is susceptible to social, political, 
and economic pressures. Rollin pleads for integrating 
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rational morality and ethics into scientific ideology 
and methodology. 
Rollin examines the philosophical and ideological 
background for current views on these subjects. In 
doing so, he covers a wide range of primary sources. 
Early in The Unheeded~ Rollin explores a perception 
to which hereturns again and again: theconflict between 
popular common sense and scientific common sense as 
regards the subjective states of nonhuman animals. 
Indeed, a major concern of the book is the rejection of 
popular "common sense in twentieth-century science, 
most especially in psychology, as regards the existence 
and knowability of consciousness in animals." He 
suggests, quite rightly, that scientific knowledge and its 
ideology are usually devoid of historical perspective. 
He asks and tries to answer the question "can common 
sense ever correct science?" 
Rollin attacks the notions that science is value-free, 
that ethical questions are outside the proper purview of 
science, and that one cannot scientifically know that 
what we do to nonhuman animals matters to them. He 
argues, correctly I believe, that "value notions and 
philosophical issues in general are part and parcel of 
science, and not merely frosting which mayor may not 
be added later." He refers to "the common sense of 
science" as a system of thought which includes the 
belief that one "cannot know that animals experience 
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pain, fear, suffering, distress, anxiety, and all other 
subjective states of consciousness which are so essential 
to our moral concern for and deliberations about our 
moral obligations to other people." He proposes that 
denying mentation and subjective experience to 
nonhuman animals is not essential to scientific teaching 
but is "rather a contingent. historical aberration" which 
can - and must - be changed "to make science both 
coherent and morally responsible." Clearly, The 
Unheeded ~ is a book about animal rights written by 
an advocate. 
Rollin discusses the concept of nonhuman animal 
consciousness as an object of scientific study. He 
observes that anthropomorphism is actually a presup-
position of nonhuman animal research. For example, to 
study anxiety, pain, pleasure, or sensory deprivation in 
nonhuman animals makes sense only if one assumes 
that human mental states exist in nonhuman animals in 
some relevant form or other. However, animal research 
advocates usually use the term 'anthropomorphism' 
only when trying to put down - rather than logically 
confront - an anti-animal research argument. 
Rollin argues persuasively that it makes biological 
and evolutionary sense that human subjective states of 
mind (e.g. hunger, taste, sexual desire, fear) exist in 
nonhuman animals - "certainly in those animals in 
which physiological, behavioral, and contextual 
similarities to humans are apparent.... Evolution entails 
continuity, and molecular biology has elegantly 
underscored the continuity at the cellular, subcellular, 
and biochemical levels. It would be evolutionarily odd 
if consciousness had emerged solely in humans, espe-
cially in lightofthe presence in other creaturesofbrains, 
nervous systems, senseorgans, pain behavior, problem-
solving, and so on.... [If] we do not allow appropriate 
animal behavior to count as evidence of feeling and 
mentation, what right do we have to allow appropriate 
human behavior to serve as such evidence?" Rollin 
proposes working criteria for theexistenceofmentation: 
the ability to adapt to new situations and to learn from 
experience. He also notes that apparent intentionality, 
plasticity, flexibility, and choice are objective signs of 
subjective awareness, whatever the species of actor. 
Inpraising the workof 19th century scientist George 
Romanes, Rollin excoriates modern behaviorist 
laboratory psychological research, stating thatRomanes' 
findings are "quite unlike that obtained through 
subsequent behaviouristic psychological experimen-
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tation, which studies animals under highly abnormal 
conditions, subject to extremely artificial and 
anthropocentric concerns and strange notions of what 
counts as 'intelligence' (for example, being able to run 
the proverbial maze); which isolates behaviour from the 
normal life-experience of the animal; which employs 
highly artificial contexts and stimuli; which gives us no 
clear picture of how the animal's mental processes 
operate during its life under natural circumstances; and 
which, in the final analysis, has given us little insight 
into the 'mind' or even the normal 'behavioural 
repertoire' of the animal [and even less insight into the 
mind and behavior of Homo sapiens]." 
Rollin refers to andquotes extensively from Charles 
Darwin and other 19th and 20th century science greats. 
He puts their work in an historical context by relating 
their work to the (sometimes discontinuous!) evolution 
ofscientific ideology. This historical perspective is one 
of the fascinating and fun aspects ofThe Unheeded Q:y. 
Forexample, Rollin examines in greatdetail the historical 
development of values and attitudes in psychological 
research and how such views of nonhuman animal 
consciousness/pain became the accepted paradigm in 
all nonhuman animal research. Heexplores the historical 
precedents of the prevailing reluctance to treat non-
human animal consciousness as a legitimate object of 
scientific study and discourse. 
Rollin gives evidence to show that "science is 
inevitably bound up with philosophical and valuational 
assumptions." Onephilosophical position ofscience-
whose discovery Rollin credits to Paul Feyeraband - is 
that "a way of knowing which allows us to control and 
manipulate what is known is a better and more valuable 
way of knowing than an approach which does not 
increase our control." Rollin continues: "one's notions 
of science and knowledge rest upon philosophical 
assumptions which are intertwined with valuational 
assumptions, both epistemic and moral, concerning 
what is worth knowing, what counts as knowledge, how 
it ought to be known, what ought and ought not to be 
done to acquire that knowledge, and so on." 
Rollin makes a thorough search of the history of 
psychological research from C. L. Morgan and George 
Romanes to the present. Rollin's hete noirs are logical 
positivism and behaviorism, for it is these schools of 
thought which have informed (or misinformed) the 
aUitudes and practices of all science pertaining to 
nonhuman animals. 
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Rollin cites early 20th century zoologist H. S. 
Jennings and others who make a case for the existence 
of "learning" even in protozoa, suggesting that 
"something like trial-and-error learning occurs even in 
lower organisms." These scientists propose that the 
behavior of lower organisms is the sort ofbehavior that 
one would expect if they had consciousness and acted 
from conscious states similar to those experienced by 
humans. Rollin argues that the notion of awareness in 
others (humans) is not a fundamental dabJm but is a 
theoretical construct based on evidence; Le., that others 
ofour speciesare awareis the bestexplanationofcertain 
phenomena, is useful in generating predictions, coheres 
with accepted evolutionary theory, and is pragmatically 
justified. This theoretical construct could as easily be 
applied to the existence of awareness in nonhuman 
animals. According to pre-behaviorist psychologists 
the existence of learning in protozoa is evidence of the 
phylogenetic continuity of mentation. Rollin quotes 
psychologist E. B. Titehener: "It is difficult to limit 
mind to [only those] animals that possess even a 
rudimentary nervous system; for creatures thatrank still 
lower in the scale of life manage to do, without a 
nervous system, practically everything that their 
superiors do by its assistance. The range of mind thus 
appears to be as wide as the range of animal life." 
Rollin argues persuasively that there is no gap 
between our knowledge of physical facts and our 
knowledge of mental facts. How we SbJdy mental facts 
and how we sbJdy physical facts are the same. Aperson 
has no "privileged access" to mental facts; statements 
that a person makes even about his/her own mental 
states may be right or wrong. All judgements of mental 
states, whether by subject or by observer, are on a par 
with each other, and on a par with judgements about 
physical facts. 
Rollin proposes that the view of behaviorism that 
came to dominate science's perceptions of nonhuman 
animalconsciousness was not theresultofnew scientific 
data giving rise to new theories but reflected no more 
than a change in values and philosophical commitment. 
J. B. Watson, the father of behaviorism, is seen as 
"attempting to sell a new philosophical-valuational 
package...subjectivementalstatesareatbestdispensible 
psychic trash, at worst non-existent." Consciousness 
came to be ignored as a legitimate object of scientific 
study. Rollin proposes that behaviorism came into 
ascendancy, becauseofscience's growing valuation for, 
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and philosophical commitment to, unity in science and 
reductionist physicalistic science. Behaviorism 
continually emphasized that only a "silly commitment 
to consciousness" stood in the way of psychology 
becoming areal science. In severalkey passages,Rollin 
observes that: 
In the absence of moral pressure for concern 
about animals, ... especially experimental 
animals in a research programme totally 
dominated by behaviouristic and positivistic 
ideology, consciousness did disappear, to be 
replaced by physical movements, which didn't 
involve 'hurt' in any subjective sense. All this 
was tremendously convenient for researchers 
doing things to animals which ordinary people 
would find horrible.... [G]iven the behaviour-
istic Gestalt, animals had no feelings, and cries 
of pain were not cries of pain at all, but rather 
'vocalization' .... Thus, moral categories 
became irrelevant.... In actual fact, the 
philosophical, valuationalassumptionspressed 
by behaviourism are not very good, even if 
they are extremely convenient for scientists 
using animals. High value was assigned to 
control, rather than understanding. Key moral 
questions which might have hamstrung or 
retarded dramatically painful psychological 
and physiological experiments on animals (and 
which ordinary common sense of the time, 
despite its lack ofmoral concern with animals, 
would have recoiled from), and which might 
perhaps have given rise to moral qualms about 
inflicting pain, fear, anxiety, terror, and so 
forth onanimals were circumventedsimply by 
denying the applicability of the notion of 
consciousness to animals.... [Nonhuman 
animal] consciousness was an embarrassment 
to science. With behaviourism, [consciousness] 
vanished from science. 
Rollin defines what he calls "the common sense of 
science" which ignores moral and value questions, 
stresses observables as the only material of science, 
values control, exalts the "pure" sciences of chemistry 
and physics, and emphasizes laboratory experiments. 
Rollin writes that"thecommon sense ofsciencedeclared 
all moral questions to be meaningless ... [and] ... 
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behaviourism further augmented the comparunental-
ization between being a scientist and being a [human 
being], between ordinary common sense and scientific 
common sense." The common sense of science is seen 
as providing a clear demarcation between science and 
other ways of knowing, especially the speculative 
methods of philosophy and religion. The common 
sense of science appears to free scientists of any 
professional responsibility for dealing with moral or 
other valuational questions; such questions are seen as 
nonempirical, emotive, and noncognitive. Rollin finds 
that scientists are genemlly loathe to admit the existence 
oflegitimate value questions or assumptions ofany sort 
within the fabric of science. As a result, he argues, the 
implications, consequences, and effects of valuational 
assumptions which are unconscious but inevitable in 
science go almost totally undetected and are almost 
never critically assessed. Scientists qua scientists usually 
claim blindness to value issues of any sort. 
A mandate to protect even human research subjects 
did not exist in the United States until 1966, and it was 
not enforced until the 1970s. Rules and regulations in 
nonhuman animal research followed not so much out 
of a recognition of moral issues but more out of a fear 
of mounting public pressure. Until recent years, codes 
of medical and veterinary medical ethics were really 
codes of professional etiquette and did not address 
relevant moral questions. Here, too, much of the 
motivation to change the codes was inspired by 
widespread media coverage of, and public interest in, 
biomedical ethical questions. 
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Rollin notes the contradiction in scientists 
proclaiming on the one hand that research animals are 
entitled to "humane" treatment and freedom from 
"abuse" while at the same time maintaining that the use 
ofnonhuman animalsper se entails no moral assumptions, 
is not subject to moral analysis, and is a matter of 
science, not ethics. These two views are simply 
incompatible with each other. Another contradiction 
common in science is the use of nonhuman animals to 
learn about such things as human pain, analgesics, 
and anesthesia, while at the same time denying - or 
claiming that we can't know - whether or not non-
human animals feel pain or distress. If nonhuman 
animals don't feel pain, then all that sort of research is 
rather pointless. 
As Rollin would not be surprised to learn, I was 
taught by scientist mentors that nonhuman animal pain 
was an oxymoron, because pain is a subjective response 
which requires words to communicate its existence 
from the sufferer to the observer. I was taught, in other 
words, that only humans can be properly said truly to 
experience pain, because only humans have the capacity 
to translate the feeling into words such as "that hurts;" 
ergo. as nonhuman animals can't speak, what they 
experience can't be called pain. Over the years, I 
disabused myself of that notion. I came to wonder how 
I could have been so naive and stupid as to believe it. 
Rollin does a masterly job of thoroughly trashing 
traditional scientific common sense attitudes toward 
nonhuman animal pain. He correctly proposes that 
science has generally regarded concern for nonhuman 
animal pain as largely sentimental and unwarranted 
anthropomorphism. He calls upon Kant, Hume, and 
Wittgenstein and notes: 
[Ina"much as] animals have perceptions of 
objects and causal relations, animals must be 
doing something other than merely sensing.... 
[T]he senses supply only momentary, ever-
changing fragments. To experience, to 
perceive, one must tie these particulars together 
-synthesize them.... [S]ensory atoms [must] 
end up being organized into wholes.... 
[A]nimals access the world via sense-organs 
which are extremely similar to ours,and which, 
in and of themselves, can provide only 
fragmented atomsofexperience.... [Therefore, 
animals must] possess concepts fairly similar 
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to our own. And since they learn from 
experience, ... they must surely possess a 
mechanism for generating empirical concepts. 
After all, an organism with no power of 
generalization and abstraction, which could 
experience onlyparticulars,could neither learn 
norsurvive.... [A]nimalsmustbeable torealize 
that an event is happening to them in order to 
learn from it. We are surely licensed to assert 
thatanimals haveasenseofselfas distinguished 
from world.... [A]nimals do anticipate and 
remember, and that is how they learn and fear. 
And if this entails having concepts, as surely it 
does, then animals have concepts, which should 
come as no surprise if they are to deal with 
the world. 
Even ifnonhuman animals were indeed inexorably 
locked in the here-and-now, we would be even more 
obliged to relieve their suffering, inasmuch as they 
would not be capable themselves ofanticipating its end 
or even ofremembering its absence. Ifthey are incapable 
of conceptualizing their suffering, then when they are 
in "pain," their whole universe is pain; there is no 
horizon; they are theirpain." Under this view nonhuman 
animal suffering is even more terrible to contemplate. 
So, laboratory animals may suffer more severely than 
do humans if only because nonhuman animals cannot 
deal intellectually with suffering as we do. The 
nonhumananimal hasn't thecognitiveability to moderate 
his/her fear and suffering. So the experience is likely 
rendered even more extreme by its total incomprehen-
sibility. In a word, Rollin argues, nonhuman animals 
must hurt more. 
Rollin discusses a number ofinconsistencies in the 
nonhuman-animals-don't-feel-painargumenl Why use 
nonhuman animals in pain research on the one hand 
while denying them the ability to feel pain on the other? 
Why would nature endow nonhuman animals with 
endogenous opiates if the animals experienced no pain? 
If the neurophysiologic mechanisms of pain are 
essentially identical in higher nonhuman animals and 
humans, why would evolution reserve the "experience of 
pain" for humans only? Feeling pain - and responding 
appropriately - is essential to survival. If pain works 
well as a purely mechanical system in nonhuman species 
without a subjective dimension, why should only Homo 
sapiens have a subjective dimension? 
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Rollin places laboratory animal pain in the context 
of today's science: how rules and regulations really 
affect laboratory animal research, how research science 
appears to be beginning to change in response to changes 
in societal attitudes toward science in general and 
nonhuman animals in particular. He contends that "as 
moral questions about animal use become pervasive in 
the culture generally, scientists are helped to recollect 
many of their common-sense intuitions about animal 
consciousness, and reappropriate some of the 
reservations and moral questions about invasive animal 
use which they [scientists] buried when learning the 
common sense ofscience years before.... In a climate in 
which moral concern for animals is expected, its 
expressionbecomespermissible, and the holdofideology 
begins to weaken." According to Rollin, many scientists 
respond less to the ethics of animal abuse issues and 
more to changes in societal attitudes toward nonhuman 
animals. He believes that many scientists still hold that 
ethical questions are irrelevant to science; placating 
society to keep the funds coming is what motivates 
many scientists. (Whether those indictments are or are 
not correct is, I believe, much less important than the 
fact thatresponsivenessandchange isoccurring, however 
slowly. Mter all, he/she who does the right thing for the 
wrong reason still does the right thing.) A few pages 
later Rollin seems to contradict those accusations when 
he writes that "research animal issues are being 
considered morally, not merely scientifically and 
pragmatically, and this change in perspective must be 
salubrious." And again, "scientists have become more 
and more willing- though this isby no means universal 
- to admit thatanimalssufferin variousways." Perhaps, 
Rollin is of two minds on this question. In either case, 
Iagree with him thatgoodthings arehappening, although 
change is slow. One captivating example is the moral 
guideline suggested in Pain (the journal of the Inter-
national Association for the Study of Pain) that an 
animal researcher try a procedure on himselflherself 
before calling it "minor." 
The Unheeded en: has an excellent section on how 
ignoring research animal mental states in any experiment 
callsinto question thescientificresul18 ofthatexperiment. 
Research animal distress is a complex matter and can be 
induced by such often ignored - but simple - things 
as rough handling, absence ofcontactwith others of the 
species, absence of kindly human contact, too small a 
living space, overcrowding, lackofexercise, and on and 
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on. ToparaphraseRollin, ourgrowing understanding of 
research animal awareness increases and deepens the 
moral questions which we are obliged to address. 
The last three chapters of the book are devoted to an 
exploration of animal consciousness. Rollin traces the 
historical development of our perception of animal 
consciousness and how that perception has been 
influenced - for better or worse - by the disciplines 
of psychology and ethology. He argues persuasively 
that"the tentativereturn ofconsciousness to psychology 
and ethology was precipitated by a variety of factors, 
social, scientific, and valuational." He gives many 
examplesofanimalawareness. Hedevisesan experiment 
- an experimental method - which demonstrates that 
"even the most private of experiences [i.e., what an 
animal is thinking] isopen to experimental examination." 
The chapters on animal consciousness are Rollin's 
kindest toward science: "animal consciousness is alive 
and well in science.... [B]ehaviour, automatically and 
arbitrarily dismissed under the ideology of science as 
purely mechanical, may now be more sympathetically 
viewed as evidence of genuine mentation." 
In this book Rollin makes a number of important 
andcompelling propositions. Researchersdoing harmful 
experiments on nonhuman animals need a defense 
mechanism to allow them to do what they do to their 
research subjects - things that if done, say, to the 
family dog would be regarded as monstrously sadistic. 
To believe that nonhuman animals have consciousness 
and mentation and suffer pain and distress - and have 
a moral value - would force a profound re-evaluation 
of a researcher's life. Such fundamental challenges to 
how one lives one's life can be most threatening and, 
consequently, likely to be denied. However, such 
valuational and moral presuppositions are part-and-
parcel of science. Science must incorporate 
philosophical thinking into science education so that, 
for example, animal researchers see as primary a 
responsibility to recognize and alleviate pain ordistress. 
Until science wholeheartedly addresses value issues, 
change within science regarding such subjects as animal 
pain and the moral status of animals will likely come 
about only via external pressures. Failure to account for 
laboratory animal pain and distress leads to scientific 
results of questionable validity. 
With The Unheeded Q:y Rollin set himself an 
ambitious task and successfully carried it off. The book 
is asmoothsynthesisofmoralphilosophyandbiomedical 
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science history. Aliterateand lively work, it is especially 
noteworthy because of the author's gift for making 
important connections. The book deserves a prize. 
However, I do have some quarrels with it. 
Rollin clearly intends the book to be read by more 
than philosophers. Indeed, I am sure that he would be 
delighted if it were widely read by, say, biomedical 
scientists and animal rightists. Thus, a glossary would 
have been especially useful. Concepts like "positivism," 
"logical positivism," "classic empiricism," and so on 
deserve definition in a book with an interdisciplinary 
framework and a potential for wide readership. Also, he 
has the philosopher's penchant for convoluted and 
over-long sentences. Shorter, clearer sentences would 
have made the book even more readable. 
There is no good excuse for the sexist language 
sprinkled throughout the text. An especially egregious 
example is the reference to pediatricians as "he," 
pediatrics being a specialty composed of over 35% 
female physicians. The words we use reflect how we 
think and also influence the thinking of those around us. 
For example, I use "it" and "that" for such things as 
rocks and trees (as in "it was the tree that was used in the 
laboratory") I use "he," "she," and "who" to refer to 
sentient beings (as in "he is the dog who was used in the 
laboratory"). I wish that Rollin had done the same, 
especially as he is one of the best friends and fiercest 
defenders that sentient beings have ever had. To call a 
sentient being an "it" objectifies rather than ennobles. I 
also try to use the phrase "nonhuman animal" (rather 
than simply"animal") when Irefer to animalsother than 
the human animal. Encouraging people, by example, to 
use the mostappropriate language helps them understand 
and redefine implicit values. 
Three other quick caveats: First, I was surprised to 
find the author using "doctor" as a synonym for 
"physician" - especially as biophysics-philosophy 
professor Rollin is a doctor himself who regularly 
instructs and consorts with other doctors in veterinary 
medicine. Second, Iknow that there is ample precedent, 
but, still, I can't get over a certain dis-ease at someone 
writing a foreword to abook in which she herself is sung 
a paean. Finally, there should be a special place in hell 
for editors or publishers who insist on (or allow) the 
particular reference format used in this book. Again, 
there is precedent, but this format is decidedly user-
unfriendly. It makes inconvenient the finding of any 
particular reference in the reference section at the back 
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of the book. There are at least three very slight 
modifications from which to choose that could have 
made the reference format friendly. 
I have only two substantive objections to Rollin's 
masterful work.. First, I found the tone of science-
baiting to be gratuitous and a bit off-putting. For 
example, he writes of "regularly" finding reports in 
Science magazine ofresearchers in "all" fields ofscience 
"caught in various acts of piracy, theft, falsification, and 
soon." Rollin surely must mean a "handful" offields and 
a "tiny percentage" of the total number of individuals 
engaged in scientific research. Any fudging or lying in 
science is outrageous, repugnant, and reprehensible. But 
the goodprofessorgreatly exaggerates the reported cases. 
I do not share Rollin's disdain for the concepts of 
scientific method and objectivity. Why put "good 
scientific method" in quotes? Why sneeringly refer to 
scientific method and objectivity as"whatever that may 
be"? Surely, he knows that the scientific method is a 
process used to arrive at scientific truths. The method, 
at its best, includes defining terms, limiting experimental 
variables to one, using statistically significantnumbers of 
subjects, drawing only those conclusions which the data 
support, accepting as valid and true only that which has 
been verified by at least one other independent 
investigator, subjecting the protocol and results to 
scrutiny by one's peers, etc. Objectivity in science 
means being aware ofone's biases andkeeping them out 
of the scientific process or, at the very least, explicitly 
stating them for all to read. 
My second major objection is Rollin's apparent 
respect for (even adoration ot) the people and their 
"ordinary common sense" versus his apparent disdain 
for scientists and "scientific common sense" regarding 
sentient nonhuman animals. I would say in this regard 
the Volk leave a lot to be desired when measured by the 
yardstick of consistency of behavior (as opposed to 
simply comparing attitudes). In other words, the 
nonscientific public may in general believe in the 
existence of nonhuman animal consciousness and 
therefore profess more enlightened (sensitive and 
compassionate) values toward nonhuman animals than 
would the average animal researcher. However, the 
important thing is not so much what we claim to believe 
but what we actually do. We are what we do. For me, 
behavior trumps attitudes and values every time. So, 
while the people may cry out (and rightly so and bless 
them) for better treatment oflaboratory animals and for 
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the end to useless and redundant experimentation, the 
people still eat, wear, hunt, bulldog, race, and otherwise 
torment and kill other animals and show little inclination 
tochange. However, scientists, byRollin's ownaccount, 
are moving to change their individual and collective 
behavior in everyday life in the direction ofless harm to 
research animals. Consequently, my respect is greater 
for the scientificcommunity that is moving significantly 
to begin to correct past injustices than for the Volk who 
decry research animal abuse yet show few signs of 
bringing a moral concern for animals into their daily 
lives. When it comes to respect, I'll give it every time 
to the person(s) beginning to make the wrenching 
changes rather than to the person(s) big on values and 
short on action. 
The Unheeded Cry will, I believe, prove to be a 
seminal work. Plus Rollin's good, high spirits -
evident throughout - make it an enjoyable read. It is 
the book to give to that biomedical scientist whose 
consciousness and sensitivity you'd like to raise. There 
will be no denying the many truths that he/she will read 
therein. It may convince; it will at least make him/her 
uncomfortable in the right kind ofway. What it teaches 
will not be easily forgotten. 
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